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Abstract We consider an extension of glove markets, called T-markets, character-
ize a family of weighted allocation rules, and deﬁne related cooperative games. For
the class of T-market games we introduce a new solution concept called the type
monotonic allocation scheme. It turns out that the nucleolus and the τ-value generate
the same type monotonic allocation scheme with nice extra properties.
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1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a new kind of monotonic allocation
schemes for special cooperative games with players of different types. Other sort of
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monotonic allocation rules for various special types of (totally) balanced coopera-
tive games have been introduced earlier by Sprumont (1990), Brânzei et al. (2001),
Voorneveld et al. (2003), and Fernández et al. (2005).
In this paper we consider markets whose corners are characterized by different
types of resources and where each player belongs to one corner and possesses one
unit of the corner-speciﬁc resource. We refer to such a market as a T(ype-based)-
market and associate with it a cooperative game which we call a T-market game. For
T-market games we introduce the notion of type monotonic allocation scheme (tmas)
and tackle the question of existence of a tmas and of the possibility of extensions of
core elements to a tmas.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce T-markets and
consider allocation rules for them. Special attention is paid to an interesting class
of weighted allocation rules, which are based on hierarchical weight systems on the
type space. In Sect. 3, T-market games corresponding to T-markets are studied. For
this kind of cooperative games we describe the imputation set, the core, the τ-value,
and the nucleolus. The τ-value and the nucleolus coincide, and these single-valued
solutions turn out to be in the barycenter of the core of such a game. In Sect. 4,t h e
notion of type monotonic allocation scheme for T-market games is introduced. Each
weighted allocation rule for T-markets generates, for each T-market game, a tmas,
and all core elements of a T-market game can be extended to a tmas. The τ-value (or
the nucleolus) applied to a T-market game and to each of its subgames (all T-market
games) turns out to generate a tmas with nice extra properties. Section 5 contains
some concluding remarks.
2 T-markets and allocation rules
In this section, we consider special markets in which t different types of comple-
mentary goods 1,2,...,t (t ≥ 2) are available in t corners of the market and where
each agent in the market belongs to one corner and possesses precisely one unit
of the corner-speciﬁc good; moreover, for each type of goods there is at least one
owner. Furthermore, a proﬁt of one unit can be obtained only if one unit of each
of the t types of goods are combined. The agents in the market with one unit of
good s are called agents of type s, and this set of agents is denoted by Ns. Then
N1,N2,...,Nt is a partition of the set N of all agents in the market. Let us denote
the set of types {1,2,...,t} by T , and let us denote by ns the number of agents in
Ns. Then the agents in N can make a proﬁt of mins∈T ns units. We will call such
am a r k e taT-market and denote it by mT :=  T,N1,N2,...,Nt , and, in situations
where only the number of agents of the different types matters, we also denote the
market by n = (n1,n2,...,nt). If there are only two types (t = 2), such a market is
called a glove market, where the agents of type 1 (type 2) possess a left (right) glove
and where a left–right pair of gloves has value 1. For relevant related literature we
refer to Shapley (1959), Shapley and Shubik (1969), Owen (1975), Rosenmüller and
Sudhölter (2002, 2004), and Apartsin and Holzman (2003).
We are interested in efﬁcient and symmetric allocation rules for T-markets which
divide for each market (n1,n2,...,nt) the total proﬁt p(n):= mins∈T ns among the
agentsinsuchawaythatagentsofthesametypegetthesameshareoftheproﬁt.Such80 R. Brânzei et al.
allocation rules can be described by a function F : Nt → Rt
+, where N ={ 1,2,...}
is the set of natural numbers, and where, for each market n = (n1,n2,...,nt) ∈ Nt
and for each s ∈ T, the share of the proﬁt of each agent of type s is Fs(n). Then  
s∈T nsFs(n) = minu∈T nu = p(n).
In the following we denote the set of scarce types of the market n by sc(n),s o
sc(n) ={ s ∈ T | ns = p(n)}=argminu∈T nu.
Example 1 The allocation rule F : Nt → Rt
+ deﬁned by Fs(n) = t−1n−1
s p(n),f o r
each s ∈ T, divides the proﬁt in such a way that the total share of each of the types
is the same amount t−1p(n).H e r eF assigns also to non-scarce agents a positive
payoff.
Example 2 Let E : Nt → Rt
+ be such that, for each T-market n, Es(n) = 0i fs/ ∈
sc(n), and Es(n) =| sc(n)|−1 otherwise. Then E divides the proﬁt equally among the
scarce members.
We introduce now a special class of efﬁcient and symmetric allocation rules in-
duced by hierarchical weight systems. A (hierarchical) weight system for T-markets
with type space T ={ 1,2,...,t} is determined by a partition {C1,C2,...,Ck} of T
in classes of types and corresponding vectors w1,w2,...,wk in Rt
+, where, for each
r ∈{ 1,2,...,k}, the carrier carr(wr) ={ s ∈ T | wr




s = 1. We will denote such a weight system by (w1,w2,...,wk) or
shortly by w. The class Cr is called the class of types of rank r, and the vector wr is
called the weight vector for this class.
Each given (w1,w2,...,wk) induces an allocation rule Fw = F(w1,w2,...,wk)
which divides the total proﬁt in a T-market n ∈ Nt among the agents that be-
long to those scarce types which have the lowest rank, and the distribution of the
proﬁt for these types is determined by the corresponding weight vector. Formally, if
 (n) = min{r ∈{ 1,2,...,k}|sc(n)∩Cr  =∅ }, then
F(w1,w2,...,wk)
s (n) =
   
w (n)
r | r ∈ sc(n)∩C (n)  −1
w (n)
s
if s ∈ sc(n)∩C (n), and F
(w1,w2,...,wk)
s (n) = 0 otherwise.




6,0,0), and w2 = (0,0,0, 1
4, 3
4). For the T-market (6,4,4,4,4) we have












Further, F(w1,w2)(6,4,4,3,4) = (0,0,0,1,0).
Note that the rule E : Nt → Rt
+ from Example 2 is also a rule based on a hier-
archical weight system with only one class C1 = T and w1 =| T|−1(1,1,...,1);s o
E = Fw1
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Let us now introduce for efﬁcient and symmetric allocation rules two properties:
the scarcety property SCARCE and the ratio consistency property CONS.
We say that F : Nt → Rt
+ satisﬁes SCARCE if Fs(n) = 0 for each T-market n ∈ Nt
and each s/ ∈ sc(n).
We say that F : Nt → Rt
+ satisﬁes CONS if for all pairs n,m ∈ Nt, for which there






for all u ∈ T. (1)
This implies, for example, that for two types s,u ∈ T with positive shares in both
T-markets n and m w.r.t. the rule F,i fs gets α times the amount which u gets in
T-market n, then this is also (consistently) the case in T-market m.
These propertieshold for rules based on hierarchicalweight systems. Clearly, each
Fw satisﬁes SCARCE.N o w ,t a k eFw = F(w1,w2,...,wk) and T-markets n,m for which
there is an s ∈ T such that Fw
s (n) > 0 and Fw
s (m) > 0. Then s is scarce in n as well
as in m, and if s ∈ Cr then  (n) =  (m) = r. So, Fw
u (m) = Fw
u (n) = 0i fu/ ∈ Cr, and
















Theorem 1 (Characterization of rules based on weight systems) An allocation rule
F : Nt → Rt
+ satisﬁes SCARCE and CONS if and only if there are k ∈ N and a weight
system w = (w1,w2,...,wk) such that F = Fw.
Proof We have already shown that a rule of the form Fw satisﬁes SCARCEand CONS.
Conversely, let F be a rule with the SCARCE and CONS properties. We construct a
weight system w as follows. Take the T-market n1 = (1,1,...,1), where all types are
scarce, and take w1 = F(n1). If carr(w1) = T ,t a k ew = (w1). If carr(w1)  = T,t a k e
aT - m a r k e tn2 with n2
s = 2i fs ∈ carr(w1) and n2
s = 1 otherwise. Then sc(n2) = T \
carr(w1), and take w2 = F(n2). If carr(w1)∪carr(w2) = T , then take w = (w1,w2).
Otherwise take w3 = F(n3), where n3
s = 2f o rs ∈ carr(w1) ∪ carr(w2) and n3
s = 1
otherwise. And so we go on.




= wh = Fw 
nh 
for all h ∈{ 1,2,...,k}. (2)
It remains to prove that F(n)= Fw(n) for all n ∈ Nt.
Take n ∈ Nt. Take among the scarce types in n a type s with Fs(n) > 0 and such
that there is no s  with Fs (n) > 0, which is in a lower class w.r.t. the hierarchy
corresponding to w.L e ts ∈ Ch. Then the T-markets n and nh have a positive payoff
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s (n) = 1, we obtain α = 1. Hence F = Fw. 
The next theorem, whose proof is left to the reader, will be useful in Sect. 4.
Theorem 2 (Type monotonicity for allocation rules based on weight systems) Let
w = (w1,w2,...,wk) be a hierarchical weight system. Let n ∈ Nt and u ∈ T with











s (n) for s ∈ T \{u}, (3)
where (n−eu) = (n1,n2,...,nu −1,...,nt), eu is the u-th basis vector in Rt.
Interpretation. If gains in T-markets are distributed using an allocation rule based on
weight systems, and one player of certain type leaves a T-market, then in the new
T-market the remaining agents of the same type are not worse off, while agents of
other types are not better off.
3 T-market games
In this section, we assign to a T-market a cooperative game and discuss how some
classical solution concepts look like for such T-market games.
First, we recall that a cooperative game is a pair  N,v , where N ={ 1,2,...,n}
is the set of players and v : 2N → R is the worth function assigning to each coalition
S ∈ 2N the worth v(S) which satisﬁes the assumption v(∅) = 0.
Now, let (n1,n2,...,nt) ∈ Nt be a T-market, where N1 ={ 1,2,...,n1} is the set







s=1ns}. The corresponding T-market
game  N,v  is given by N =
 t
s=1Ns and, for each S ⊂ N,
v(S)= min
 
|S ∩N1|,|S ∩N2|,...,|S ∩Nt|
 
(4)
where |R| is the number of elements in set R. Note that v(N) = p(n). Non-trivial
coalitions, i.e. coalitions S ∈ 2N \{∅}with v(S) = 0 and their (positive) type distrib-
ution vectors t(S)= (|N1 ∩S|,...,|Nt ∩S|) will play a key role in Sect. 4. Note that
n = t(N). Let us call a coalition S ∈ 2N a simple coalition if it consists of t players,
all of a different type.
The imputation set I(v)is the set of individual rational allocations of the worth of




       
n  
i=1




for each i ∈ N
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xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N
 
.
Theorem 3 Let (n1,n2,...,nt) ∈ Nt be a T-market with corresponding T-market
game  N,v . Then:
(i) I(v)= conv{p(n)ei | i ∈ N}, where ei is the i-th basis vector in Rn.
(ii) C(v)  =∅ , and it consists of all vectors of the form [α1,α2,...,αt], where  t
s=1αs = 1, αs ≥ 0 for each s, and αs = 0 if s/ ∈ sc(n), and where [α1,α2,
...,αt] denotes the vector x in Rn with xi = αs for each s ∈ T and i ∈ Ns.
Proof (i) Since t ≥ 2, the worth v({i}) = 0 for each i ∈ N.S oI(v)={ x ∈ Rn
+ |  n
i=1xi = v(N)}=conv{v(N)ei | i ∈ N}.
(ii) Take ﬁrst x =[ α1,α2,...,αt]∈Rn
+ with
 














s∈T αs|R ∩ Ns|≥
 
s∈T αs minu∈T |R ∩ Nu|=  
s∈T αsv(R)= v(R).S ox ∈ C(v). Conversely, let z ∈ C(v). We have to prove that
there are β1,...,βt such that z =[ β1,β2,...,βt]∈Rn
+, where
 
s∈T βs = 1 and
βs = 0i fs/ ∈ sc(n).
For each simple coalition S,w eh a v e
 
i∈S zi ≥ v(S)= 1. Take one of the many









j=1 v(Sj) = p(n). This implies that
 
i∈Sj zi = 1 for each j = 1,...,p(n), and that zi = 0 for each i ∈ N \ (
 p(n)
j=1 Sj).
Since each simple coalition is a member of such a family, we have
 
i∈S zi = 1
for each simple coalition S. Similarly, since each non-scarce player is left out from
at least one such family, we have zi = 0 for each non-scarce player i. Finally, let
s ∈ sc(n) and let k,  ∈ Ns. We claim that zk = z . Take a simple coalition S with




i∈S  zi = 1i tf o l -
lows that zk = z .
Now let βs = zi for each s ∈ T and some i ∈ Ns. Then z corresponds to
[β1,β2,...,βt]. 
Remark 1 The imputation set of a T-market game is a simplex in Rn whose extreme
points are those allocations where one player obtains the whole worth of the grand
coalition N. Core elements are imputations where players of the same scarce type get
the same share and players of a non-scarce type get nothing.
Theorem 4 Let  N,v  be the T-market game corresponding to the T-market n ∈ Nt.
Then for the τ-value τ(v)and nucleolus η(v) the following assertions hold:
(i) τi(v) =| sc(n)|−1 for i ∈ Nr and r ∈ sc(n), and τi(v) = 0 otherwise.
(ii) τ(v)= η(v).
(iii) The τ-value and the nucleolus, restricted to T-market games, are the only rules
which assign to each such a game a core element with coordinates the same for84 R. Brânzei et al.
all players of a scarce type and coordinates zero for the players of a non-scarce
type.
Proof First, we note that in a T-market game non-scarce players are not entitled to
a positive value according to the τ-value (Tijs 1981) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler
1969). Further, from the anonymity property that both the nucleolus and the τ-value
satisfy, we obtain equal share for scarce players of the same type. 
Remark 2 Let us make some geometric observations following from the two pre-
ceding theorems, where we deal with a game  N,v  corresponding to the T-market
n ∈ Nt. For each r ∈ sc(n), we can consider the simplex Ir(v) = conv{v(N)ei |
i ∈ Nr}, which is a face of the simplex I(v) with the barycenter br =
 
i∈Nr ei.
The core C(v) of the game  N,v  equals the convex hull of these barycenters, i.e.
C(v) = conv{br | r ∈ sc(n)}, so the core is also a simplex. The barycenter of the
core equals the τ-value and the nucleolus: τ(v)= η(v)=| sc(n)|−1 
r∈sc(n)br.T h e
following example may be illustrative.
Example 4 Let  N,v  be the game corresponding to the T-market n = (2,2,3).
Then N ={ 1,2,...,7} and I(v) = conv{2ei | i ∈ N}. Further, sc(n) ={ 1,2},
I1(v) = conv{2e1,2e2}⊂I(v), I2(v) = conv{2e3,2e4}⊂I(v), b1(v) = e1 + e2,
b2(v) = e3 + e4, and C(v) ={ (α1,α1,α2,α2,0,0,0) ∈ R7
+ | α1 + α2 = 1}=







4 Type monotonic allocation schemes
In the following for a game  N,v  also its subgames  S,v  play a role. Here, S ∈
2N \{∅}and v : 2S → R is the restriction of v : 2N → R to the set 2S of subcoalitions
of S. Special attention is paid to so-called allocation schemes, which assign to a
game and its subgames a collection of payoff vectors, one for each subgame. Such
an allocation scheme can be denoted by [xS
i ]S∈2N\{∅},i∈S, where xS = (xS
i )i∈S ∈ RS,
and can be seen as a (defect) matrix with n columns corresponding to the players and
2n − 1 rows corresponding to the nonempty coalitions. An allocation scheme for a
game  N,v  is called stable if for each S ∈ 2N \{ ∅ }the vector xS is an element of
the core C(S,v)of the subgame  S,v . So, C(v)= C(N,v).
In the literature one ﬁnds stable allocation schemes with special monotonicity
properties. Sprumont(1990) has studied for totally balancedgames  N,v  population
monotonic allocation schemes (pmas) [xS
i ]S∈2N\{∅},i∈S, where xS ∈ C(S,v) for each




So, a player i gets a better payoff in the larger coalition S ∪{j} than in S. In Brânzei
et al. (2001), for total big boss games (cf. Muto et al. 1988)  N,v  with player 1 as the
big boss, bi-monotonic allocation schemes (bi-mas) [xS
i ]S∈BN,i∈S were introduced,
where BN ={ S ∈ 2N | 1 ∈ S}, xS ∈ C(S,v) for each S ∈ BN, and for all S ∈ BN






1. So, in a bi-mas
the big boss is not worse off in a larger coalition and the other players are not betterType monotonic allocation 85
off. Y. Sprumont proved that for convex games each core element x ∈ C(N,v) is
extendable to a pmas [xS
i ]S∈2N\{∅},i∈S, where xN = x. Further, if xS is the Shapley
value (Shapley 1953)o f S,v , then [xS
i ]S∈2N\{∅},i∈S is a pmas for the convex game
 N,v . For total big boss games also each core element is bi-mas extendable and
the τ-value applied to the subgames containing the big boss generates a bi-mas (cf.
Brânzei et al. 2001).
The objective of this section is to introduce a new sort of stable monotonic alloca-
tion schemes for the class of T-market games with the type set T.
Note ﬁrst that for a T-market game  N,v  corresponding to the T-market
 T,N1,N2,...,Nt , the subgame  S,v  with S ∈ 2N \{ ∅ }corresponds to the sub-
market  T,N1 ∩ S,N2 ∩ S,...,Nt ∩ S  if v(S)  = 0. So, non-trivial subgames of a
T-market game are also T-market games.
Weareonlyinterestedinallocationschemesfor(totallybalanced)T-marketgames
with special properties. First, we want that such an allocation scheme assign to the
non-trivial subcoalitions S core elements of the subgame  S,v . This implies, ac-
cording to Theorem 3, that in the subgame players of the same type obtain the same
payoff, while non-scarce players obtain zero. Secondly, we want that the allocation
scheme be type distribution consistent, i.e. if for two subgames  S1,v  and  S2,v 
we have t(S1) = t(S2) for each s ∈ T, then the allocation scheme should assign the
same payoff to the players of type s in both subgames. This implies that such an al-
location scheme for  N,v  can be represented by a map αn :{ m ∈ Nt|m≤n}→Δ,
where Δ ={ β ∈ Rt
+ |
 
s∈T βs = 1} and n = t(N). For a non-trivial coalition S ∈ 2N
with positive type distribution vector t(S), αn
u(t(S)) is the payoff assigned to players
of type u in S.
Now we come to our main notion.
Deﬁnition 1 A type monotonic allocation scheme for a T-market game  N,v  with
type set T and type distribution vector n = t(N)is a map αn :{ m ∈ Nt | m ≤ n}→Δ
with the following two properties:
• (Stability) αn
s (m) = 0 for each m ≤ n and s ∈ T \sc(m).
• (Type monotonicity) For all m ∈ Nt and s ∈ T such that m − es ∈ Nt,w eh a v e
αn
s (m−es) ≥ αn
s (m) and αn
u(m−es) ≤ αn
u(m) for each u ∈ T \{s}.
So, a type monotonic allocation scheme has the following property: if a player
leaves a coalition, the remaining players of the same type are not worse off and the
other types of players are not better off in the new core allocation (for the remaining
coalition) than in the old core element.
We illustrate this notion with two examples.
Example 5 Let  N,v  be the 5-person game with N1 ={ 1}, N2 ={ 2,3}, and
N3 ={ 4,5}. Then assigning to each non-trivial subgame the τ-value leads to a type86 R. Brânzei et al.
monotonic allocation scheme which can be represented by the matrix
⎛


















⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
where the columnscorrespond to the types 1,2,3 and the rows to the type distribution
vectors of the non-trivial subcoalitions. In  N \{ 2},v  the remaining player of type
2 is, in comparison to  N,v , not worse off (1
2 > 0) and the players of types 1 and 3
are not better off (1
2 < 1,0 = 0).
It turns out (Theorem 5) that the τ-value and the nucleolus generate for each
T-market game a type monotonic allocation scheme. Also, other weighted alloca-
tion schemes for T-markets generate type monotonic allocation schemes for T-market
games, as we see in Example 6 and Theorem 5.
Example 6 Consider the game in Example 5 and apply the weighted allocation
scheme F((1
3,2
3,0),(0,0,1)) to the type distribution vectors of the game and the sub-


















where in the third row we ﬁnd (1,0,0) = F((1
3,2
3),(1))(1,2,1).
Take an arbitrary weighted allocation rule Fw for T-markets, where w =
(w1,w2,...). Then, for each T-market game  N,v , the vector Fw(t(N)) is a
core element for  N,v . This together with Theorem 2 implies that αw :{ m ∈
Nn | m ≤ t(N)}→Δ with αw(m) = Fw(m) for each m is a type monotonic
allocation scheme for the T-market game  N,v . The weight system (w1) with
w1 = t−1(e1+e2+···+et) corresponds to α(w1), and α(w1) assigns to each subgame
its τ-value (or nucleolus). So we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Let  N,v  be a T-market game with type set T . Then:
(i) For each hierarchical weight system w, αw :{ m ∈ Nt | m ≤ t(N)}→Rt
+ is a
type monotonic allocation scheme for  N,v .
(ii) An allocation scheme for  N,v  which assigns to each subgame the τ-value (or
the nucleolus) is a type monotonic allocation scheme.Type monotonic allocation 87
The followingtheorem impliesthat each core element z of a T-market game  N,v 
is extendable to a type monotonic allocation scheme, where the element assigned to
 N,v  corresponds to z.
Theorem 6 Let z ∈ C(N,v) and t(N)∈ Nt. Then there is a hierarchical weight
system w such that αw(t(N)) = z.
Proof Construct the vector w1 ∈ Rt
+ as follows. For each type s ∈ T take an i ∈ Ns
and put w1
s = zi. If carr(w1) = T, then take w = (w1). If carr(w1)  = T ,t a k ea s
weight system w = (w1,w2), where w2 is an arbitrarily chosen vector w2 ∈ RT
+ with
the properties that carr(w2) = T \ carr(w1) and that the sum of the coordinates is 1.
Then αw
s (t(N)) = zi for each i ∈ Ns.S oαw(t(N)) corresponds to the core element
z of  N,v , and αw is a type monotonic allocation scheme which ‘extends’ z. 
Example 7 Let  N,v  be the 4-person T-market game with N1 ={ 1,2} and N2 =
{3,4}. Then z = (1,1,0,0) ∈ C(N,v), which corresponds to αw(2,2), where w =
(w1,w2) with w1 = (1,0) and w2 = (0,1). Note that αw(2,2) = αw(1,2) =
αw(1,1) = (1,0), and αw(2,1) = (0,1).
5 Concluding remarks
This paper considers a special class of markets, called T-markets, whose corners are
characterized by different types of resources and where each player belongs to one
corner and possesses one unit of the corner-speciﬁc resource. We have introduced
allocation rules for T-markets and analyzed some of the properties and solutions of
the related cooperative games, called T-market games. Our main contribution is the
introduction of a new monotonicity property, which we have called type monotonic-
ity. We have shown that for T-market games the nucleolus and the τ-value coincide
and that they yield a type monotonic allocation scheme.
We note here that a T-market can be seen as a linear production situation with one
product, t resources, a technology matrix containing only ones, and an endowment
matrix in which each player possesses only one resource. Such linear production
(LP-) situations arise from simple max ﬂow situations (cf. Kalai and Zemel 1982,
Reijnierse et al. 1996) where each player owns one arc with capacity one, and there
are t + 1 nodes p0,p1,...,pt, where p0 is the source, pt is the sink, and players
whose arcs connect pk−1 to pk,f o rk = 1,...,t, are all of the same type k.I ti sw e l l
known that for these simple ﬂow situations the minimum cut solutions correspond to
the extreme points of the core of the corresponding ﬂow game. So, this core corre-
sponds to the set of Owen vectors of the related LP-situation. It looks intriguing but
difﬁcult to extend the existence of tmas to a larger subclass of LP-situations.
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